Spoiled Broth? Section 895 of the Oklahoma Economic
Development Pooled Finances Act Bounces Between
Committees and Co-opts Terms to Defend Your New Back
Yard
I. Introduction
Development fees (also called impact fees) have traditionally been
utilized by municipalities to address infrastructure costs associated with
new development, and reflect the burden that additional development
imposes on municipal infrastructure.1 Municipal development fees are often
assessed through a conferred taxation power from the state or tied to a
municipality’s zoning power.2 Specific to this comment, section 895 of the
Oklahoma Economic Development Pooled Finances Act (section 895)
addresses development fees assessed through a zoning or permitting
power.3 Though development fees have historically been utilized to offset
the direct costs associated with new development (for example, water and
wastewater service, police and fire protection, or roadways),
contemporarily many municipalities that occupy large land areas have
turned to development fees to address city sprawl.4 These municipalities
have ratcheted up such fees in attempts to encourage density in new
construction, arguing that new developments should pay for their actual
costs to the municipalities.5 At a minimum, development fees serve to
ensure that new development absorbs all infrastructure costs associated
with the construction, rather than passing costs to the already existing
community.6
1. 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6:31 (2d ed.
2012). The term “development fee” will be used in this comment as used in 62 OKLA. STAT.
§ 895 (2011).
2. Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to
Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 553 (2008).
3. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(1).
4. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 180-82 (2006).
5. See Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution
in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867 (1993)
(surveying the State of Washington’s statutory growth management scheme).
6. David L. Callies & Malcolm Grant, Paying for Growth and Planning Gain: An
Anglo-American Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact Fees and Development
Agreements, 23 URB. LAW. 221, 222-23 (1991) (“Under the schemes for ‘impact fees,’ now
operated in several states, the developer is charged a fee that is calculated in accordance with
the type, scale and location of the proposed development and is applied to mitigate its impact
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Oklahoma Senate Bill 708 establishes the standards Oklahoma’s
municipalities must meet in adopting development fees.7 This comment
focuses on the constitutional requirements for such fees, the judicial
background in Oklahoma, and changes the bill makes in this field. This
comment also attempts to reconcile seemingly discordant portions of the
bill, and predict how a court tasked with analyzing the statute would rule.
Part II of this comment presents the statute itself and pinpoints issues
within the text, focusing on subsections (B) and (K). In contrast to the
majority of the bill, which focuses on matters of administration, these
subsections set out the standards that courts must use to determine the
propriety of an enacted development fee. Part III presents the federal
constitutional background; specifically, this section focuses on Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission8 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.9 Though
these cases addressed property exactions, their holdings have been extended
in many jurisdictions to development fees. Part IV addresses state and
federal interpretations of the constitutional framework, with an appropriate
focus on Oklahoma courts. This section highlights the commonalities
(though they are few) between the Nollan/Dolan line of cases and
Oklahoma case law. These similarities will color the manner in which the
statute must be interpreted. Part V presents statutory construction and
interpretive issues through the appropriate lens of the foundational case
law. As a relevant aside, this section also addresses the manner in which
Oklahoma maintains legislative history and its effects on statutory
interpretation. Part VI notes other minor but potentially serious issues in
reconciling the text, with a focus on the definitions provided in the
beginning of the text and the method through which development fees are
assessed in the statute.
II. Background and History, Oklahoma City as an Example
Oklahoma City is colossal. By land area, it is the third-largest city in the
United States among cities with populations of at least 100,000 citizens.10

on the community. A properly designed fees system attempts to allocate infrastructure costs
equitably between developers in accordance with an adopted schedule of capital facilities,
and to offer a guarantee that the infrastructure will actually be provided within a specified
time, or the fee returned.”).
7. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895.
8. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
9. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
10. Cities with 100,000 or More Population in 2000 Ranked by Land Area, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cit1010r.txt (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
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Its more than 600 square miles, however, are home to only around half of a
million citizens.11 As a consequence, the cost of municipal infrastructure
and public service in Oklahoma City is much higher per capita than in cities
of similar population with higher population densities. In 2003, the City of
Oklahoma City unsuccessfully proposed increasing development fees to
curtail municipal layoffs;12 in 2008, the city again proposed levying
additional development fees, estimating that each new residential unit
placed a $4856 burden on the municipality’s infrastructure.13 Though the
movement toward increasing development fees has not gained traction,
perhaps due to a downturn in residential construction14 or a concern that
new development would move to neighboring municipalities,15 Senate Bill
708 passed the Oklahoma legislature in May 2011 and was codified at title
62, section 895 of the Oklahoma Statutes.16
Despite the ease of its passage, codification of the statute was not an
efficient process. It is notable that the bill moved through numerous
committees prior to its codification, which is perhaps the cause of the
internal conflicts noted in this comment.17 Chronologically, the bill was
referred to the General Government Committee; referred to the Judiciary
Committee; referred to the Economic Development, Tourism, and Financial
Services Committee; again referred to the Judiciary Committee; and again
referred to the Economic Development, Tourism, and Financial Services
Committee.18 In all, there were eight iterations of the bill.19 Indeed, many
legislators had input during the course of the bill’s passage.
Though the measure was criticized by some Oklahoma state senators as
taking away “local control,” the bill passed the Oklahoma Senate handily.20
11. About Oklahoma City, CITY OF OKLA. CITY, http://www.okc.gov/about/index.html
(last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
12. Bryan Dean, Raising Building Fees Touted as a Way for City to Avoid Cutting Jobs,
OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 2003, at B1.
13. Richard Mize, City Mulls Construction Fee, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 22, 2008, at B6.
14. Id.
15. Bryan Dean, How to Pay for City Growth? Builder Fees, Council Told,
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 18, 2007, at A12.
16. See S.B. 708, 2011 Leg., 53rd Sess. (Okla. 2011); see also 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895
(2011).
17. State of Oklahoma History of a Bill: Measure Number(s) SB 708, 2012 Regular
Session (Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter History of a Bill: SB708] (on file with the Oklahoma
Law Review).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Development Impact Fee Bill Heads to Governor, 23RD & LINCOLN (May 3, 2011),
http://jrlr.net/23rd-and-Lincoln/2011/05/03/development-impact-fee-bill-heads-to-governor/. The
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Certainly, developers wished to maintain the low development fees in the
State of Oklahoma as compared to other jurisdictions.21 And, though no
immediate threat loomed on the horizon, the bill may turn out to be a
prescient maneuver by the construction community as curtailment of city
sprawl and equitable division of infrastructure costs gain support in
Oklahoma City.22 As the gap widens between city expenses and revenue, as
is projected, Oklahoma City may have to look beyond development fees to
address growing costs.23
III. Section 895: The Text and Its Issues
Oklahoma Senate Bill 708 of the first session of the fifty-third legislature
(that is, section 895) was first read on February 7, 2011,24 and was signed
into law on May 10, 2011, by Governor Mary Fallin.25
A. A Brief Survey of the Text
The text of the statute is exhaustive, but it will be advantageous to have
at least a flavor of the measure in the reading of this comment. The statute
begins by mandating that municipalities that adopt development fees
comply with the statute, and it continues with statutory definitions.26 The
purposive definition of “development fee” is particularly worth noting; in
full, the definition states:
“Development fee” means any payment of money imposed, in
whole or in part, as a condition of approval of any building
permit, plat approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to

Senate passed the House amendments with thirty-four in favor and only eight opposed (six
senators were excused). S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1056 (Okla. 2011), available at
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110503.pdf.
21. Mize, supra note 14.
22. See Michael Kimball, OKC Meeting Draws 500 to Discuss Urban Sprawl,
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 7, 2011, at A10.
23. On its current course, Oklahoma City is projected to have a budget shortfall of $18.7
million by 2017. Clifton Adcock, The Gap Trap, OKLA. GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2012, at 14,
available at http://npaper-wehaa.com/oklahoma-gazette/2012/02/08/#?article=1512635.
24. S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 206 (Okla. 2011), available at http://www.
oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110207.pdf.
25. S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1103 (Okla. 2011), available at http://www.
oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110510.pdf.
26. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A) (2011).
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pay for public infrastructure systems that are attributable to new
development or to expand or modify existing development.27
Subsection (B) provides that new and expanded or modified
development can only be charged for capital improvement that “increases
or expan[ds] . . . the capacity of public infrastructure systems attributable to
that development.”28 The subsection mandates that “[d]evelopment fees
shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined
proportionate share of the cost” of the infrastructure improvement
attributable to the increase or expansion of the service capacity; requires “a
clearly established functional nexus between the purpose and amount of the
development fee being charged and the development against which the fee
is charged;” and establishes a documentation requirement that the
“development fee is reasonably and roughly proportional to the nature and
extent of the impact of development.”29 This subsection also provides that
development fees cannot be assessed for repairs, that the fees must be based
upon actual costs or “reliable, ascertainable and reasonable projected
estimates,” and that development fees are limited to “public infrastructure
system capital improvements.”30
Subsection (C) mandates the provision of a development fee schedule
based upon land use, the purpose of the fee, and termination upon funding
of the purpose of the fee.31 Additionally, a capital improvement plan that
lists the necessary public infrastructure improvements, provides notice to
developers, and delineates among property locations is required.32
Alternatively, municipalities may establish geographic “service areas for
the collection of development fees.”33 The final portion of subsection (C)
requires both “a public hearing before the municipal planning commission”
and “a subsequent public hearing before the municipal governing body”
prior to the adoption of “any development fees, capital improvement plan,
service plan, or creation of service areas.”34 The subsection also includes a
grandfathering provision for previously adopted development fee schemes,

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 895(A)(1).
Id. § 895(B).
Id. § 895(B)(1).
Id. § 895(B)(2)-(4).
Id. § 895(C)(1).
Id. § 895(C)(2).
Id.
Id. § 895(C)(3).
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but makes clear that any modification to such schemes must be in
accordance with the new statutory scheme.35
Subsection (D) reiterates that development fees must be limited to capital
improvements to infrastructure and provides that the assessment of fees
must be with significant detail and in writing.36 The subsection also
provides for proportionality when changes are made in capital improvement
plans or service areas and notes that such changes are also subject to the
previously mentioned hearing process.37 Subsection (E) requires detailed
annual reporting to the municipality’s governing body and allows for either
the return of funds if the body determines the purpose for which the
development fee was adopted has been fully funded or for a repurposing of
the funds through the hearing process set out in Subsection (C)(3).38
Subsection (F) requires that fees not be collected prior to issuance of a
building permit.39 Subsection (G) allows municipalities to contract with
developers for the construction of the necessary infrastructure
improvements and to credit the improvements made against the assessed
development fee.40
Subsection (H) clarifies that the statute is not meant to preclude real
estate exactions.41 Subsection (I) makes credits against development fees
nontransferable.42 Subsection (J) establishes accounting standards and the
level of detail required to be available as public record.43 Subsection (K)
defines the standard by which a reviewing court will uphold a challenged
development fee scheme.44 Specifically, the subsection provides that a
development fee scheme will be reviewed through “rational-basis scrutiny,”
and that the fee will be upheld if it “substantially complies with this section
and if the municipality documented reasonably conceivable facts that
provided a rational basis for the adoption.”45
Subsection (L) clarifies that imposition of development fees is not
required and illustrates the standards through which a governing body can

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See id. § 895(D).
Id. § 895(D)(2).
See id. § 895(E).
Id. § 895(F).
Id. § 895(G).
See id. § 895(H).
Id. § 895(I).
Id. § 895(J).
Id. § 895(K).
Id.
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allow a developer to apply for exemption from the imposition of a fee.46
Subsection (M) makes clear that payment of a development fee will not be
deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the imposition of the fee at a later
time.47 Subsection (N) precludes a municipality from recovering
infrastructure costs through the imposition of connection fees in addition to
development fees.48 Subsection (O) clarifies that municipalities can selffund infrastructure improvements through methods other than development
fees, reiterating the notion that the act is not preclusive concerning
municipal choice for infrastructure.49
Clearly, the statute imposes an onerous framework with which a
municipality must comply if it is to assess development fees. This comment
does not address the potential implications of the burdens of this taxation
system (for example, that the scheme might lead a municipality to
altogether abandon development fees), but instead seeks to predict what a
court will find necessary for compliance in a few key areas and how much
greater of a burden is placed upon municipalities above the extended
constitutional baseline. Additionally, this comment seeks to gauge how a
court will address vague, misleading, and conflicting language within the
statute, as some of the language, if given its traditional importance,
conflicts with the whole of the statutory requirements. Should this statute
come under court scrutiny, significant harmonization will be necessary.
With the striking demographic changes within Oklahoma’s major cities,
this will become an issue as urban and suburban interests diverge.50
B. Adjudicative Issues
Most of section 895 addresses administrative procedure.51 As well, it
unequivocally limits development fees to “public infrastructure system
capital improvements.”52 It is worth noting though that development fees in
the context of the statue do not simply mean fees assessed upon new
development as a result of the impact of the new development. For the
purposes of the statute, a development fee is “payment of money
46. Id. § 895(L).
47. Id. § 895(M).
48. Id. § 895(N).
49. See id. § 895(O).
50. See generally Dale Funk, Oklahoma City’s Rebound, ELEC. WHOLESALING, Apr.
2011, at 22-24; D. Ray Tuttle, Timing Success in Tulsa: Developers Assess Downtown’s
Growth, Potential, J. REC. (Nov. 8, 2011, 6:27 PM) http://journalrecord.com/2011/11/08/
timing-success-in-tulsa-developers-assess-downtown’s-growth-potential-real-estate/.
51. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895.
52. Id. § 895(B)(4).
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imposed . . . as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat
approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to pay for public
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to
expand or modify existing development.”53 However, two subsections stand
out among the others as most important to adjudicative determinations:
subsection (B)(1) and subsection (K).
Subsection (B)(1) states:
B. New development and expanded or modified existing
development may only be charged the development fee for
capital improvement costs for increases or expansion to the
capacity of public infrastructure systems attributable to that
development.
1. Development fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable,
and reasonably determined proportionate share of the cost of
capital improvement to the public infrastructure system
attributable to the expansion or increase in functional service
capacity generated, or to be generated by, the development being
charged the fee. There shall be a clearly established functional
nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee
being charged and the development against which the fee is
charged. In determining the development fee, the municipality
shall make a documented effort to quantify the projected impact
from development and determine that the proposed development
fee is reasonably and roughly proportional to the nature and
extent of the impact of development.54
The particularly important phrases are emphasized above. The subsection
mandates that “[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable,
and reasonably determined proportionate share of the cost of
[infrastructure] capital improvement.”55 Though the statute requires the
municipality to document estimates and costs,56 precision and
proportionality will be a judicial determination if challenged. The
subsection also provides that there must be a “clearly established functional
nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee being

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 895(A)(1) (emphasis added).
Id. § 895(B) (emphases added).
Id. § 895(B)(1).
See id. § 895(B)(1), (3).
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charged” and the new development.57 This standard will also need to be
clarified by the courts and will likely be compared to the “essential nexus”
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.58 Finally, the subsection establishes that a proposed
development fee must be “reasonably and roughly proportional to the
nature and extent of the impact of development,” again making degree of
proportionality a matter of judicial concern.59
Subsection (K) requires:
K. Any ordinance, resolution, or regulation adopted in
compliance with this section which is thereafter challenged in
any future court action shall be reviewed through rational-basis
scrutiny, such that it shall be upheld if it substantially complies
with this section and if the municipality documented reasonably
conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the
adoption.60
Again, the significant language is emphasized. This subsection also
presents unique problems, both announcing “rational-basis scrutiny” for
judicial review and mandating substantial compliance with the statute.61
However, development fee assessments or schemes that would be
permissible under rational basis scrutiny are foreclosed by the statute. It
will be necessary for a court to harmonize this subsection with the whole of
the statute and to clarify the meaning of the statutory judicial review
requirements, likely limiting the application of rational basis scrutiny.
IV. Constitutional Background
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”62 As the language of section 895 bears much in common
with the United States Supreme Court’s rulings on property exactions, a
court ruling on the statute would likely at least look to those rulings for
comparison. Though the Supreme Court has ruled on similar taxation
schemes involving Fifth Amendment Takings Clause concerns, the case law
has not addressed impact or development fees. Instead, Takings Clause
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. § 895(B)(1).
See 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987).
See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).
Id. § 895(K) (emphasis added).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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rulings by the Supreme Court have dealt with property exactions.63 In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
Supreme Court established a test beyond simple rational basis to determine
the constitutionality of municipal property exactions.64 Thereafter, lower
courts divided in applying the Supreme Court rulings concerning exactions
to development fees.65 As the property exaction cases have been widely
analyzed, their presentation here will be concise.66
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: The Supreme Court Decides
Rational Basis Just Is Not Enough
Nollan was the first case decided by the Supreme Court directly
addressing real estate exactions and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.67 In the case, the California Coastal Commission required the
Nollans to deed the public an easement for beach access across their
beachfront property in order to obtain a permit to demolish a bungalow on
63. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
64. Though not wholly accurate, the Nollan/Dolan standard is often characterized as
“intermediate scrutiny” or “heightened scrutiny.” See, e.g., Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A.
Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 433 (Ct. App. 1996); Smith v. Town of Mendon,
822 N.E.2d 1214, 1223-24 (N.Y. 2004); Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 754 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003).
65. Some cases decline to extend Supreme Court exactions jurisprudence to
development fees. See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir.
1995) (holding that exaction case law is only applicable to physical intrusions or the
functional equivalent thereof onto private property); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist.,
19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding a generally applicable service fee is not
subject to the Nollan/Dolan three-pronged test). Other cases extend the exactions
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 1996)
(holding a discretionary zoning permit conditioned upon the payment of fees imposed on an
individual property owner implicated the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan); Ocean
Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 449-50
(Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to overturn a mitigation fee despite appellant’s assertion of
unconstitutionality under Dolan); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City
of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ohio 2000) (“[I]mpact fees are closer in form to land
use exactions than to zoning laws.”).
66. For a broad discussion of exactions and their space in the spectrum of Supreme
Court Takings Clause jurisprudence, see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for
the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 366-70 (2007).
67. By the time Nollan was decided, the Court had, of course, long recognized
permanent physical occupation of property (for example, a traditional overland lateral
easement) as a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
433 (1982) (describing the landowner’s right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” (quoting Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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the property and replace the structure with a house.68 The California Coastal
Commission reasoned that the new, larger structure would contribute to a
psychological barrier of homes that would discourage citizens from
utilizing the public beach.69
The Court reaffirmed that “land-use regulation does not effect a taking if
it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y]
an owner economically viable use of his land,’”70 and found that
conditioning a building permit upon allowing an easement for public beach
access fit this rubric.71 In addition, the Court required an “essential nexus”
between the exaction and the harm created by the development.72 When the
exaction “utterly fails” to alleviate the harm provided as justification for the
exaction, constitutional propriety evaporates.73
Therefore, the test at that time became two-pronged. First, the Court
reaffirmed that an exaction by a state must satisfy the traditional substantive
68. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 834 (alterations in original) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260 (1980)).
71. Id. at 836-37. The Court expressly confirmed that a property exaction is not
necessarily a taking despite appearances. Id. at 836. The Court provided its own
hypothetical, requiring the Nollans to create a public viewing spot on their property, and
stated that the power to deny or regulate construction derived from the state police power
“include[s] the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a
concession of property rights, that serves the same end.” Id.
72. Id. at 837. The Court stated, “If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose
would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange
to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes
the same purpose is not.” Id. at 836-37. However, the Court defined an essential nexus in
large part in the negative: “The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the
justification for the prohibition.” See id. at 837. This method of definition has led to
voluminous scholarly commentary. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the
“Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and
Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 378 (2002) (defining an
essential nexus as requiring “(1) a legitimate state interest or purpose; (2) a connection
between that interest and the land use exaction chosen to address it; and (3) a minimal
connection between the impacts of the proposed development and the land use exaction”); J.
David Breemer, What Property Rights: The California Coastal Commission’s History of
Abusing Land Rights and Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 247, 264 (2004) (representing an essential nexus as a “direct connection”); Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1612 (1988) (characterizing an
essential nexus as “the Court’s insistence on being satisfied that the claimed nexus was
sufficiently apparent and credible to counteract suspicion of taking by subterfuge”).
73. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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due process inquiry of a legitimate state interest under rational basis
examination,74 and clarified that a broad array of government purposes
satisfy such examination.75 Second, the essential nexus test must be
satisfied.76 Under this new test, the Court found that the California Coastal
Commission’s asserted purpose of public beach access failed to meet the
essential nexus requirement;77 the concern that the structure created a
psychological barrier to public use of the beach would not be alleviated by
granting a lateral easement across the Nollans’ property.78 The Court noted,
simply, that if the Commission wanted an easement across the petitioner’s
property, “it must pay for it.”79
B. Dolan v. City of Tigard: The Supreme Court Clarifies that Left Unclear
Dolan, the successor to Nollan, added a third element to the inquiry.80 In
Dolan, the City of Tigard conditioned the petitioner’s building permit upon
devotion of space to a greenbelt and bike path.81 The petitioner was
required to dedicate a portion of her land that occupied a 100-year flood
plain to drainage, as well as for a bike path pursuant to a state statute.82
Despite her application, the petitioner was denied an exception from these
exactions.83 The Court heard the case to clarify whether the “essential
nexus” test had supplanted other determinations of causality when
evaluating government exactions.84
Though the Court found an “essential nexus” between the development
and the exactions, it still struck down the exaction based upon an added

74. See id. at 834.
75. Id. at 835. The Court surveyed prior case law, listing scenic zoning, landmark
preservation, and residential zoning as permissible purposes upheld in prior cases. Id.
76. See id. at 837-42.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 838-39.
79. Id. at 842.
80. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Commentary widely discusses
Takings Clause property exaction analysis as a “three-pronged” or “three part” inquiry. See,
e.g., Jack Estill et. al., Taxing Development: The Law and Economics of Traffic Impact Fees,
16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 7 (2006); James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings
Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103, 116 (1996); Lawrence Watters, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Introduction and Decision, 25 ENVTL. L. 111, 117 (1995).
81. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80.
82. Id. at 380.
83. Id. at 381-83.
84. Id. at 383.
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“rough proportionality” consideration.85 The Court split the difference in
what it perceived as a wide variance among states in determining the
constitutionality of the relationship between the government exaction and
the impact of development pursuant to its allusion in Nollan.86 The Court
rejected both weak, general connection tests and stringent “specifi[c] and
uniquely attributable” tests, instead favoring a middle ground of rough
proportionality.87 Under this test “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is
required, but [a government] must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”88
Thus, with the inclusion of rough proportionality, the test became threepronged: (1) the exaction must advance a legitimate state interest, (2) there
must be an essential nexus between the exaction and the harm advanced as
the impetus for the exaction, and (3) the exaction must be roughly
proportional in nature and extent to the harm of the development.89 The
Court remanded the case for a ruling consistent with the opinion,
accompanied by a finding that the city’s requirement of public dedication of
the proposed greenbelt did not meet the “rough proportionality” standard
and suspicion of the lack of factual findings that the bike path would reduce
traffic.90
As a coda, the Court has significantly returned only once to its property
exactions Takings Clause jurisprudence, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.91
In the case, the Court abrogated the “substantial advancement” test derived
from Agins v. City of Tiburon.92 As Nollan and Dolan had cited and adopted

85. See id. at 391, 394-96.
86. See id. at 391. To reiterate, the Court in Nollan did not comment upon the nature of
the connection necessary in exactions evaluations as the easement requirement in that case
did not meet “even the most untailored standards.” Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825, 838 (1987).
87. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91 (alteration in original) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav.
Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
88. Id. at 391.
89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394-96.
91. 544 U.S. 528, 546-48 (2005).
92. Id. at 532. Though not of consequence in this matter, the “substantial advancement”
test provided that government regulation of property effects a taking if it does not
substantially advance a legitimate government interest. Id. at 531; Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), overruled by Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
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the language of Agins,93 the Court determined it necessary to reevaluate the
status of its property exaction Takings Clause jurisprudence.94 Though the
Court noted similarities in language, the Court found the two tests
incomparable, characterizing the Nollan/Dolan test as a determination
“whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests that landuse authorities asserted would allow them to deny the permit altogether.”95
Thereafter the Court declared that Lingle “should not be read to disturb
these precedents.”96
V. Lower Courts
Lower courts have struggled considerably in determining the extent to
which Nollan and Dolan are applicable beyond property exactions. In
addition, when courts find that the cases apply to monetary fees, there is
disagreement when the manner of imposition differs (i.e., whether the
imposition is made on an individual basis or a jurisdiction-wide basis).
Though some older Oklahoma cases suggest how an Oklahoma court might
rule, the developments in higher courts since these decisions make their
implications hardly determinative; furthermore, Oklahoma courts have not
issued an instructive opinion since the issuance of relevant Supreme Court
decisions.
A. Lower Court Confusion: Supreme Court Dicta Breeds Chaos
There has been ambiguous indication from the Supreme Court that the
Nollan/Dolan decisions should not be extended beyond exactions of real
property for public use. The Court stated in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.: “[W]e have not extended the roughproportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions—
land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication
of property to public use.”97 The Court continued, stating that “the roughproportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a case such as this one,” and
that the Dolan test “was not designed to address, and is not readily
applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the

93.
(1987).
94.
95.
96.
97.

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 547 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 548.
526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
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landowner’s challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of
development.”98
In Del Monte Dunes, the City of Monterey had repeatedly denied a real
estate developer’s plans to improve a parcel of land.99 The Court found it
necessary to address Dolan only because the intermediate court had cited
the case in its decision, and the Court found that the case was inapplicable
to denial of land use by regulation.100 Del Monte Dunes, therefore, is
properly read only as making clear the distinction between land use
regulation and exaction. As exactions and development fees are kindred, it
is not appropriate to apply this differentiation to development fees.101 Thus,
though cases following Nollan and Dolan have been suggestive, they have
hardly been on point regarding fees. Thereby, lower courts have been in
conflict determining whether the Supreme Court’s rulings in Nollan and
Dolan apply when a party’s real property is not taken, but merely assessed a
fee.
Some courts have declined to extend the three-pronged test to impact
fees. For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, the
Supreme Court of Colorado declared Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to
monetary impositions as a class of state actions.102 In that case, the
Breckenridge Sanitation District assessed a plant investment fee upon new
development, which was challenged under the principles of Nollan and
Dolan.103 After surveying the development of Supreme Court exactions
jurisprudence and noting the above pronouncement in the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Del Monte Dunes,104 the court stated, “Because Nollan, Dolan, and
their progeny applied heightened scrutiny only where the government
demanded real property as a condition of development, we find that they

98. Id. at 703.
99. Id. at 693-94.
100. Id. at 702-03.
101. As a historical note, development fees began as “in lieu of” fees and are often still
presented in this manner. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 202. Under this characterization,
development fees are an alternative to or replacement for exactions and are fundamentally
tied to the exaction process. Id. Such a conception of development fees would give assurance
to a reviewing court that it was not overreaching in applying a taxation scheme tied in
essence to the exaction process. See id.
102. 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
103. Id. at 691-92.
104. Id. at 695-97.
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are not applicable to a general development fee.”105 This sentiment has been
reiterated by many state courts.106
Some courts, however, have found the test applicable to fees. For
example, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the Supreme Court of California
rejected the notion that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to “monetary
exactions.”107 In that case, the petitioner was required to pay a $280,000
recreation fee in order to acquire the necessary permits to demolish a
recreation center and to construct a condominium complex.108 That court
explained, “When such exactions are imposed . . . we conclude that the
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is
triggered.”109 The court ruled that the city could not measure its loss based
on the value of property that it had no right to control,110 and reaffirmed that
“when a local government imposes special, discretionary permit conditions
on development by individual property owners . . . Nollan and Dolan
require that such conditions, whether they consist of possessory dedications
or monetary exactions, be scrutinized under the heightened standard.”111
This holding is also echoed in other lower court cases.112
Additionally, courts have distinguished fees (and exactions) which are
assessed individually by a regulatory body from general, statutorily applied
impact fees,113 deriving this distinction from the Dolan Court’s instruction
that rough proportionality and the essential nexus require “some sort of
individualized determination.”114 Some courts have applied the
105. Id. at 697.
106. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993,
999-1000 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (upholding the imposition of a water resource development
fee); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (upholding an impact
fee assessed for the purpose of road improvements based upon increase in traffic caused by
development); Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cnty., 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md.
1994) (upholding, relevantly, municipal impact fees, the proceeds of which were allotted to
improvements in the area of development).
107. 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996).
108. Id. at 434-35.
109. Id. at 444.
110. Id. at 449.
111. Id. at 447.
112. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ohio 2000) (“[I]mpact fees are closer in form to land use exactions than to
zoning laws.”).
113. Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to
Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 559 (2008).
114. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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Nollan/Dolan line of cases to municipal codes without reference to or
reliance upon regulatory board decisions.115 In contrast, other courts have
maintained that Dolan was specific in distinguishing particular,
adjudicative exactions from broad statutory impositions, and thus have
found the line of cases to be inapplicable to legislative impositions.116 This
notion only further exemplifies the confusion of lower courts concerning
the constitutional requirements of the Takings Clause as the clause applies
to municipal fees. It is this considerable void that section 895 seeks, in part,
to address. In light of the great degree of conflict, the text of the Oklahoma
statute must legislatively impose a higher level of scrutiny resembling the
Nollan/Dolan standard to ensure that the statute is in line with current
jurisprudence.
B. Oklahoma Rulings: The Sparse Prologue to the Statute
As of April 2013, no apparent Oklahoma state court cases have directly
addressed the implications of Nollan/Dolan after the handing down of those
cases. Case law in this area has seen challenges to determine whether
substantial interference with land ownership by the government constituting
a taking has occurred.117 Challenges under the Oklahoma Constitution for
fee assessments by municipalities to repay private dedication of utilities
infrastructure have been brought as well.118 However, Oklahoma courts
have neither had the occasion to interpret the Nollan/Dolan “essential
nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, nor had the occasion to consider
the tests as applied to municipal fees.
Prior to the Nollan/Dolan rulings, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
addressed the notion of proportionality.119 In Public Service Co. of
Oklahoma v. Northwest Rogers County Fire Protection District, the court
determined that a fire protection tax assessment scheme based upon
115. See, e.g., Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ga.
1994); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641-42
(Tex. 2004).
116. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002);
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). For
discussion, see Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions
in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 252-57 (2000).
117. See, e.g., Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, ¶ 4, 617 P.2d 1347, 1348; Frost
v. Ponca City, 1975 OK 141, ¶ 12, 541 P.2d 1321, 1323-24.
118. See Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 1989 OK 171, ¶ 1, 790 P.2d 1067,
1068.
119. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. Nw. Rogers Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist., 1983 OK 96, ¶¶
31-36, 675 P.2d 134, 141-42.
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property value bore the required “rational relationship” for constitutional
propriety.120 The court stated, “If the value-based assessment has a rational
relationship to the question of benefit conferred, it is not
unconstitutional.”121 It is worth noting that the court also used language
describing a “rational nexus” to determine constitutional propriety.122 Such
a nexus, though, in this context, was only a method of describing
proportionality and was not a nexus inquiry in line with Nollan.
The importance of this decision is that it falls within the middle ground
line of state cases referenced in Dolan to develop the rough proportionality
test, though not in an exactions context.123 In Dolan, the Supreme Court
recognized a collection of state court cases which characterized
proportionality in exaction cases as a determination of “whether the
requirement has some reasonable relationship . . . to the use to which the
property is being made.”124 The Court adopted this view as the rough
proportionality test.125 Though in a benefit context, rather than a harm
context, this parallel suggests that faced with the opportunity, an Oklahoma
court might apply the Nollan/Dolan line of cases to development fees. At
the least, it supports the notion that an Oklahoma court would find
commonalities where proportionality is concerned. However, this
assumption is made both in absence of reference to the statute in question
and without respect for the interim developments between the decision and
the statute.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in Clajon Production Corp. v.
Petera, which limited the applicability of the Nollan/Dolan analysis to
situations involving developmental exactions.126 In that case, the petitioner
challenged the Wyoming hunting and fishing licensing scheme.127 The
Tenth Circuit denied the petitioner’s Takings Clause claims, noting the
“distinctions between general police power regulations and development
exactions, and the resemblance of development exactions to physical
takings cases.”128 The court stated: “[W]e believe that the ‘essential nexus’
and ‘rough proportionality’ tests are properly limited to the context of
120. Id. ¶ 36, 675 P.2d at 142.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994).
124. Id. (quoting Simpson v. N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. at 391.
126. 70 F.3d 1566, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 1570-71.
128. Id. at 1579.
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development exactions.”129 However, this decision is not instructive for
multiple reasons. First, though development fees are similar to the licensing
fees in Clajon Production, in that both are monetary impositions,
development fees are analogous both in nature and purpose to property
exactions. Therefore, development fees and property exactions bear a
stronger analogy. Second, Clajon Production dealt specifically with a
Wyoming statute and thus is not necessarily applicable or instructive in
interpreting Oklahoma’s statutory provisions.130 Finally, and most
importantly, the fundamental holding of the case was a decision based in
regulatory takings law, rather than property exactions law.131 Though the
Tenth Circuit made the blanket statement that the Nollan/Dolan holdings
“are properly limited to the context of development exactions,”
development fees are not imposed under the same general police powers
involved in the imposition of licensing fees considered by the court.132
Oklahoma federal district courts have only referenced the Nollan/Dolan
decisions in a single reported case, ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry,133 which
was subsequently overturned by the Tenth Circuit.134 Even disregarding the
procedural history, ConocoPhillips and the Tenth Circuit’s reversal of the
case lend little clarification as the matter at issue was a state statute
outlawing property holders’ rights to ban entrants from keeping firearms in
locked vehicles.135 The heart of the issue was the extension of Takings
Clause jurisprudence to a property use restriction, which the Tenth Circuit
declined to do.136 Therefore the case is not instructive, as neither exactions
nor development fees are concerned with the question of how restrictive of
property rights a statute must be to impose a taking. Exactions and fees are
obvious complete deprivations.
Simply, there is a dearth of precedent regarding the application and
extension of the Nollan/Dolan line of cases in Oklahoma. Though Public
Service Co. is suggestive of extension, it is hardly determinative
considering the subsequent developments. Therefore, it is reasonable to

129. Id.
130. See id. at 1579-80.
131. Id. at 1580.
132. Id. at 1579.
133. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d
sub nom., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
134. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1211.
135. Id. at 1202.
136. Id. at 1209.
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view section 895 as a legislative extension into this void, in a move to avoid
the muddled mess that has washed over other jurisdictions.
Arguably, section 895(B)(1), which requires “a clearly established
functional nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee
being charged and the development against which the fee is charged”137
resembles the “essential nexus” test of Nollan.138 The standard that
“[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, and reasonably
determined proportionate share”139 of the infrastructure improvement aligns
with the “rough proportionality” of Dolan.140 “Reasonably and roughly
proportional to the nature and extent of the impact of development”141 more
closely resembles the “rough proportionality” of Dolan,142 but addresses a
determination standard for the municipality in assessment, rather than the
court.143 Therefore, the issue to be determined is what standard, in
comparison to the constitutional baseline, the statute intends to impose.
However, any judicial determination will necessarily have to address
section 895(K) as well. The subsection provides that a development fee
scheme is subject to “rational-basis scrutiny” when evaluated by a court.144
This notion, if taken at its traditional constitutional meaning, is antithetical
to the entirety of the statute. The statute seeks to impose a burden upon
municipalities far above “rational basis” when imposing development fees.
Therefore, to square this provision with the remainder of the statute, a court
must interpret this provision in light of the whole bill.
VI. Statutory Construction
Should a development fee scheme be challenged in an Oklahoma court,
several of the provisions in section 895 will need to be clarified, and a
variety of statutory interpretation principles will govern the outcome.
Additionally, some of these provisions are in conflict with each other when
applied to the statute. Thus, priority among the principles must be
determined and applied, giving the highest deference to the principle that
legislative intent is supreme.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011).
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).
Id. § 895(K).

2013]

COMMENTS

175

A. Principles of Statutory Construction as Outlined by the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma
Before the rules of statutory construction are applied, there must be a
determination that a statute is ambiguous or that the intent of the legislature
is not clearly expressed.145 In accord, “When the Legislature has clearly
expressed its intent, the use of additional rules of construction are almost
always unnecessary and a statute will be applied as written.”146 The
highlighted ambiguities and contradictions in section 895, however, easily
meet this initial burden.
As a first priority when interpreting and applying a statute, a court must
determine the intent of the legislature: “The primary goal of statutory
construction is to ascertain and follow the intent of the legislature.”147 It
follows that, concerning section 895, the Oklahoma legislature intended to
impose a comprehensive scheme for the adoption of development fees, and
to limit such fees to public infrastructure capital improvements.148
Secondarily, a court must determine the meaning of a statute in its direct
language. According to case law, “The words of a statute will be given their
plain and ordinary meaning unless it is contrary to the purpose and intent of
the statute when considered as a whole.”149 This consideration will
primarily be of importance in evaluation of subsection (K), which imposes
“rational-basis scrutiny” on reviewing courts when considering section
895,150 but will also be important in evaluating subsection (B). As
previously mentioned, the plain meaning of this “rational basis” is
antithetical to the intent of the statute and cannot be given its traditional
constitutional definition, at least not in a broad sense.
Additionally, “In order to avoid judicially imposing a different meaning
from that the Legislature intended, [courts] will not place a strained

145. See Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307;
Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817; cf. Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶ 4,
741 P.2d 449, 452 (“[I]t is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to discern Legislative
intent if the will is clearly expressed.”).
146. Samman, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d at 307.
147. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 606, 609; accord Hurst v. Empie, 1993
OK 47, ¶ 18, 852 P.2d 701, 706; State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 1982 OK 148, ¶
20, 663 P.2d 718, 722.
148. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(4).
149. Stump, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d at 609 (emphasis added); accord Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK
88, ¶ 4, 834 P.2d 439, 440-41; Keck v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1940 OK 357, ¶ 7, 108 P.2d 162,
164.
150. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K).
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construction on the plain words of a statute.”151 This requirement will also
be of importance when determining what interpretation a court must give to
subsection (K). This limiting mandate must be subordinate to the prior
considerations though. Also, legislative intent is not recorded in Oklahoma
in any manner in which a reviewing court would be comfortable citing in an
opinion. As well, disharmony may be avoided by the provision that
“[g]eneral words in a statute must receive general construction, unless
restrained, explained, or amplified by particular words.”152 The extensive
use of modifying words and phrases within the statute will make this
provision instructive in the interpretation of the statute.
Finally, “statutes must be interpreted to render every word and sentence
operative, rather than in a manner which would render a specific statutory
provision nugatory.”153 This will be of importance both in interpreting the
provisions of subsection (B) as they compare with the Nollan/Dolan line of
cases and in determining how a court will render the operation of
subsection (K). This notion bolsters the presumption that the statute intends
to impose strict standards beyond the baseline constitutional requirements.
B. Application of the Principles to the Statute
It is first necessary to determine the interpretation an Oklahoma court
will likely give to the provisions of subsection (B), and how these
provisions compare with the constitutional baseline. In Dolan, the Court
clarified concerning “rough proportionality” that “[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required, but [a municipality] must make some
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”154
From Nollan, a Court will likely find a lack of an “essential nexus” when
the exaction “utterly fails” to advance the claimed legitimate interest.155
Therefore, the “clearly established functional nexus” required by the statute
may impose a more stringent burden of proof on the municipality prior to
imposition of a development fee.

151. Crutchfield v. Marine Power Engine Co., 2009 OK 27, ¶ 27, 209 P.3d 295, 305;
accord Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613; Thornton v. Woodson, 1977 OK 185, ¶ 10, 570 P.2d
340, 342.
152. Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613 (emphasis added); accord Okla. Tax Comm’n v.
Fortinberry Co., 1949 OK 75, ¶ 14, 207 P.2d 301, 305.
153. State ex rel. Thompson v. Ekberg, 1980 OK 91, ¶ 7, 613 P.2d 466, 467; accord
Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613; Matthews v. Rucker, 1918 OK 29, ¶ 5, 170 P. 492, 493.
154. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
155. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
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1. “[C]lear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined proportionate
share”156
The first provision of section 895(B) that evokes the Nollan/Dolan line
of cases is the provision that “[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear,
ascertainable, and reasonably determined proportionate share of the costs of
capital improvement to the public infrastructure system attributable to . . .
the development.”157 This standard readily brings to mind the standard of
“rough proportionality” imposed by the Court in Dolan;158 however, this
provision is a determination of the relationship of the amount of the
assessed fee and the impact of the development, rather than a determination
of the relationship of the proposed remedy (in Dolan, an exaction) and the
impact of the development.159 Under rough proportionality, no
“mathematical calculation” is required.160 However, “clear” and
“ascertainable” carry a notion of precision and positive determination.161
In Dolan, the Court surveyed many state approaches to proportionality,
settling on what it found to be the constitutionally proper middle ground of
a “reasonable relationship,” which the Court recoined as “rough
proportionality” to avoid confusion with the rational basis standard of
review.162 Oklahoma would likely have fallen into this middle path.163
Certainly, the standard of “clear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined
proportionate share” does not bear resemblance to the slack, generalized
standards that the Court rejected as not sufficiently protective of property
rights.164 However, it is possible that this language imposes by statute the
proportional burden that the Court rejected as too stringent for a
constitutional baseline.165 The Court called the heightened relationship
requirement “the ‘specifi[c] and uniquely attributable’ test.”166 Under this
test, “[I]f the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is
directly proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes
156. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011).
157. Id.
158. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
159. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).
160. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
161. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895 (B)(1).
162. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91.
163. See supra Part V.B.
164. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389.
165. See id. at 389-90.
166. Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)).
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‘a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of
private property behind the defense of police regulations.’”167
In the case discussed by the Supreme Court as illustrative of the
heightened standard, Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether an exaction
imposed upon a developer for the purposes of school and recreational
facilities was constitutionally permissible.168 Though the court recognized
that the need for the facilities was due in great part to the addition of 250
residential units made by the development, it found that the need could not
be solely attributable to the development.169 Therefore, the court decided
any exaction not made necessary specifically and uniquely by a new
development amounted to an unconstitutional taking.170
Determining which standard is more appropriate is difficult. The terms
“clear” and “ascertainable” align with the concept of “direct
proportionality” under what the Court termed the “specific and uniquely
attributable test;” however, a “reasonably determined proportionate share”
is certainly evocative of the “reasonable relationship” which the Court later
termed “rough proportionality.”171 Because the statute readdresses the issue,
imposing “reasonabl[e] and rough[] proportional[ity]” at the end of the
same subsection,172 and because the tenets of statutory interpretation
mandate a statute be considered in full,173 the “clear, ascertainable, and
reasonably determined proportionate share”174 will likely be determined
akin to “rough proportionality.”
However, there is no certainty an Oklahoma court will draw this
correlation, despite the congruous language between Dolan and section
895(B)(1); the statute (in this subsection and as a whole) certainly imposes
a degree of specificity beyond Dolan. Likely, a reviewing court will look to
the outgrowth of case law from Dolan in applying the statute, while also
requiring specificity in the measurement of the impact itself. That is to say,
the proportionality may be “rough,” but the variables must be exact.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 390 (quoting Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 802).
Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 800-01.
Id. at 802.
Id.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90.
62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011).
Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d 606, 609.
62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1).

2013]

COMMENTS

179

2. “[R]easonably and roughly proportional to the nature and extent of
the impact of development”175
This language is the standard under which a municipality must determine
the cost of a fee, and the standard under which a fee will be upheld.176
Certainly, based on plain language analysis, “reasonably and roughly
proportional” invokes the “rough proportionality” standard of Dolan; and
the standard establishes that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is
required.”177 Though the standard itself requires no mathematical
determinations, the subsequent text of the statute establishes various
estimate and cost invoicing requirements for municipalities.178 The practical
effect of this provision is that no specific ratio is to be imposed upon
municipalities instituting a development fee system, but a clear system of
attribution must be in place. Perhaps it would be best to characterize this
standard as “rough proportionality with details,” meaning the precise extent
of the connection of the development to the infrastructure system need not
be determined, but the amount or percentage to be required of a new
development must be determined with the previously unrequired
“mathematical precision.”
3. “[C]learly established functional nexus”179
Subsection (B)(1) provides that development fees and impact of
development must evince a “clearly established functional nexus;”180 this
standard is readily evocative of the “essential nexus” of Nollan. The entire
phrase—“clearly established functional nexus”—does not appear
significantly in real property law; therefore, a reviewing court will not have
instructive case law on which to base its ruling.181 A court will have to
compare the term “functional nexus” and the Nollan case law, and
determine whether emphasis should be placed on terminology or proximity
in subject matter.

175. Id.
176. See id. § 895(B)(1), (K).
177. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
178. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(C).
179. Id. § 895(B)(1).
180. Id.
181. A quick search of legal databases reveals that the statute is the only place in the law
where this string of terms appears.
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The exact term “functional nexus” is commonly found in bankruptcy law
when determining whether an item is a household good.182 Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit held in In re McGreevy:
[T]he requisite functional nexus exists where—and only
where—the good is used to support and facilitate daily life
within the house. It is the household good’s use for these
purposes that distinguishes it from a good that is merely located
and used within the house. Pots and pans are household goods
because they are used to support and facilitate daily household
living; a model car collection, by contrast, is not a household
good because it serves no such purpose.183
Through this analogy, it is arguable that a functional nexus is fundamentally
different from an essential nexus, as an essential nexus only requires a
connection between a state’s legitimate aim and the exaction imposed.184 A
functional nexus requires a much more existential connection, requiring
items of property to be fundamentally tied together in nature.185 Under a
functional nexus inquiry, the purpose of the development fee (the public
infrastructure system) would necessarily support and facilitate the
development itself.
If the comparison holds, a functional nexus likely would require a
stronger tie to the development than the essential nexus standard. This
notion is bolstered by section 895(B)(4), which states that “[d]evelopment
fees may only be imposed to recover or fund the costs of public
infrastructure system capital improvements, including, but not limited to,
the cost of real property interest acquisitions, rights-of-ways, capital
improvements, design, construction, inspection, and capital improvement
construction administration, related to one or more public infrastructure
systems.”186 This notion is also supported by the statute’s aim of attempting
to completely preclude a variety of constitutionally sound purposes for
development fees not tied in function to development.
182. See, e.g., In re McGreevy, 955 F.2d 957, 961 (4th Cir. 1992); Fraley v. Commercial
Credit (In re Fraley), 189 B.R. 398, 401 (W.D. Ky. 1995). The term is also used in the First
Amendment context for government actors, but the term is used in an interchangeable, nonexclusive manner. See Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1996).
183. McGreevy, 955 F.2d at 961.
184. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987).
185. Cf. McGreevy, 955 F.2d at 962; Michael G. Hillinger, How Fresh a Start?: What
Are “Household Goods” for Purposes of Section 522(f)(1)(b)(i) Lien Avoidance?, 15
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 46-47 (1998).
186. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(4) (2011).
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However, this determination necessarily raises an additional issue: What
is the range of public infrastructure improvements that support and facilitate
a development? By statutory definition, the improvements must be real
property improvements,187 but this is where the clarity ends. It is unclear
whether educational or recreational facilities would be fundable through
development fees. Curiously, they are absent from the list of acceptable real
property improvements contained within the statutory definition of public
infrastructure systems, though the definition does not purport to be
exclusive.188
Some courts have found these improvements within the acceptable range
of public infrastructure systems while others have not,189 but it is arguable
that such improvements are not tied to a development on a baseline,
existential level. This disagreement among Oklahoma’s peers also supports
a stricter definition of functional nexus as a legislative attempt to avoid
confusion. If a functional nexus were interpreted to impose a connection to
the degree that a public infrastructure system must be essential to the
operation of a development, then educational and recreational facilities may
fall outside of this requirement. However, under a broad interpretation of
the standard of supporting and facilitating, such improvements might still
be deemed acceptable under the statutory development fee scheme.
Also at issue is the “clearly established” standard. In other contexts, this
standard commonly arises in civil rights violation and qualified immunity
cases.190 Such a comparison is unhelpful, however, as the term in the
qualified immunity context deals with the degree to which an individual’s
substantive statutory or constitutional rights are firmly rooted in the law.191
Rather, in the context of the statute, “clearly established” concerns the
degree to which the municipality must connect a development fee and a
development. This language mostly serves to bolster the notion that the
187. Id.
188. Id. § 895(A)(3) (“‘Public infrastructure system’ includes any real property
improvement, fixture, or accession that is included within, but not limited to, any of the
following categories of public systems.”).
189. Compare Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King Cnty., 54 P.3d 213, 215 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2002) (approving of impact fees assessed for the benefit of a school), with Bldg.
Indus. Ass’n of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 506
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (striking down a fee assessed for park services as an unconstitutional
tax).
190. For discussion, see Miranda Creviston Motter, The Clearly Established Test: What
Is the Standard and Why It Wasn’t Followed in Wilson v. Layne, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 513,
516 (2001).
191. Id.
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“clearly established functional nexus” standard is more stringent than the
“essential nexus” standard of Nollan.
In sum, the choice of the legislature to mandate a “clearly established
functional nexus,” rather than to employ the available “essential nexus”
terminology will place a reviewing court in the awkward position of
weighing relevant legal subject matter against identical legal language that
has specific and well-defined meaning. Interpreting legislative intent is
paramount, but when competing interpretations are differing shades of the
same aim (unlike the rational basis scrutiny question), rather than
competing concepts, the plain meaning must be settled upon.192 The
application of words’ “plain and ordinary” meaning that is required under
the principles of statutory construction makes the phrase “functional nexus”
analogous to the stringent definition that has been discussed and affirmed
repeatedly in bankruptcy proceedings.193 This view is supported by the
requirement that courts not place a strained meaning on a word or phrase.194
If this interpretation is accepted by a reviewing court, an additional facet
is added to the statute: not only are the acceptable purposes for
development fees limited in kind, but they are also limited in nature and
scope. It is hard to imagine that a roadway or transportation system, for
example, that is specifically included within the ambit of the statute will
satisfy the requirement of support and facilitation unless it directly services
the development; the same can be said about police and fire protection. This
distinction also calls into question the recreational infrastructure that is
specifically mentioned within the statute.195 Regrettably, this is what a
“functional nexus” necessarily requires.196 A court will have much to weigh
in this consideration.
4. “[R]ational-basis scrutiny”197
The most problematic part of the statute is subsection (K), which
provides that a fee scheme instituted in accordance with the statute “shall be
reviewed through rational-basis scrutiny, such that it shall be upheld if it
substantially complies with this section and if the municipality documented
192. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d 606, 609.
193. See, e.g., Local Union No. 38 v. Andershonis (In re Andershonis), 324 B.R. 247,
249-50 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2004); In re Mason, 254 B.R. 764, 772 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000).
194. Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 609.
195. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(3)(e) (2011).
196. Cf. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. Cnty. of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill.
1995) (noting that a need to ease traffic satisfied the essential nexus standard).
197. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K).
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reasonably conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the
adoption.”198 A development fee subject only to the constitutional baseline
review of rational basis, however, might be far broader than the preceding
subsections of the act allow. In addition, such a review will fail to meet the
constitutional standard of Nollan/Dolan if a court applies the statutory
standard to fees.199 Indeed, Nollan referenced prior California Coastal
Commission cases based upon rational basis review that were to become
inconsistent with the holding of that case.200 Therefore, this phrasing must
have separate importance from the traditional rational basis review, which
will require torsion from a reviewing court.
In defining rational basis, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]his Court’s
cases are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal
Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a
legitimate state interest.”201 In this context, under rational basis, a
development fee will be upheld if it rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest. However, the limiting nature of the act may seek to preclude a
variety of purposes that would be valid under this analysis (for example,
fees for educational facilities). As well, rational basis is only one of three
total test prongs that a property exaction must satisfy in Supreme Court
Takings Clause analysis.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has interpreted rational basis in the
same light. For example, in Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent School
District No. 30, the court interpreted the rational basis test as a “highly
deferential standard that proscribes only that which clearly lies beyond the
outer limit of a legislature’s power.”202 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
has characterized “arbitrary, capricious, [or] irrational” statutes as falling

198. Id.
199. The holdings of Nollan and Dolan are in addition to the requirement of meeting
rational basis review. Necessarily, the constitutional baseline is beyond rational basis. See
supra Part IV.
200. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987) (citing Grupe v. Cal.
Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587-90 (Ct. App. 1985); Remmenga v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1985)).
201. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).
202. 2003 OK 30, ¶ 12, 66 P.3d 442, 448; accord Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv., Inc.,
1986 OK 75, ¶ 7 n.8, 730 P.2d 510, 513 n.8 (recounting the court’s application of the
rational basis standard in a case involving neither suspect classification nor fundamental
rights).

184

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:155

outside the bounds of rational basis.203 Thus, Oklahoma’s interpretation of
this broad standard is in line with the traditional interpretation of rational
basis scrutiny.204 A reviewing court will therefore have to harmonize the
traditional function of the term with the goals of the statute.
Again, according to Oklahoma case law, “The words of a statute will be
given their plain and ordinary meaning unless it is contrary to the purpose
and intent of the statute when considered as a whole.”205 Therefore, a
reviewing court will necessarily need to construe the provision for
“rational-basis scrutiny” with the aid of the subsequent clause which
provides that a development fee scheme will be ratified “if it substantially
complies with [the statute] and if the municipality documented reasonably
conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the adoption.”206
Rational basis, in the context of the statute, must be taken to mean (1)
compliance with the statute, and (2) a rational basis for adoption. Therefore,
“rational basis” will be taken as meeting rational basis scrutiny within the
enumerated categories.
Though it may seem counterintuitive to render a phrase virtually
inoperable in this manner, such a conclusion is supported by case law. For
example, in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, the
court stated:
It is a cardinal rule that in the construction of statutes the
legislative intent must govern, and to arrive at the legislative
intent the entire act must be considered, together with all other
enactments upon the same subject, and when the intention of the
Legislature can be gathered from the entire statute, words may
be modified, altered, or supplied to give the statute the force and
effect which the Legislature intended.207
Therefore, even traditional, widely-recognized meanings can be altered or
appended if the intent of the legislature makes such action necessary.
An unlikely but frustrating possibility also exists. In viewing the
imposition of rational basis scrutiny, a reviewing court might take
subsection (K) as a cue from the legislature that it did not intend to connect
development fees to the Nollan/Dolan line of cases. This outcome would
203. Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, ¶ 19, 846 P.2d 1107, 1116 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
204. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
205. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 606, 609 (emphasis added).
206. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K) (2011).
207. 1923 OK 400, ¶ 16, 216 P. 917, 921 (emphasis added).
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severely jeopardize any certainty, beyond the statute itself, a municipality
might have in structuring its development fee scheme. However, because of
the multiple connections between Nollan/Dolan and section 895, and the
conflict of rational basis scrutiny with the aim of the statute, this seems
implausible.
A reviewing court will necessarily have to interpret the provision as
beyond true rational basis; and, regrettably, this subsection realistically is of
spurious value. The rational basis review provision can only be
meaningfully applied to the purpose inquiry and cannot be applied to the
extent inquiry, as the extent inquiry is a constitutionally (and now
statutorily) mandated standard beyond rational basis. A provision
mandating rational basis review is valueless when the remainder of the
statute clearly imposes a burden beyond that standard for upholding a
development fee scheme. This subsection only serves to confuse and is
antithetical to the aims of the statute.
C. Legislative History in Oklahoma, a Puzzling Contradiction
When a statute is found to be ambiguous and statutory construction
principles are not determinative, a court may look to the legislative history
of a bill for direction in its interpretation. Substantive legislative history
typically includes committee reports, official minutes, and transcripts of
floor debates; Oklahoma courts have not shied from turning to legislative
history when available in interpreting statutes.208 For example, in In re
Estate of Little Bear, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted that legislative
history may be accessed “in order to clear up doubt and to determine
legislative intent.”209 Though the case dealt with an inapposite matter of
American Indian law, it is beneficial to note that the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma not only made the pronouncement of the propriety of
interpreting legislative history, but also based its decision in part upon
committee reports concerning the legislation.210
However, it is important to reiterate that evaluation of legislative intent
by an Oklahoma court is predicated on the court first finding that a statute is

208. See, e.g., In re Estate of Little Bear, 1995 OK 134, ¶ 28, 909 P.2d 42, 52; In re
Martin’s Estate, 1938 OK 322, ¶ 29, 80 P.2d 561, 565-66; cf. Todd v. Frank’s Tong Serv.,
Inc., 1989 OK 121, ¶ 5, 784 P.2d 47, 49 (explaining that when evaluating conspicuous
federal law intent to preempt state law, legislative history can be considered to identify
congressional intent).
209. 1995 OK 134, ¶ 28, 909 P.2d at 52.
210. Id. ¶¶ 32, 43, 909 P.2d at 52, 55-56.
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ambiguous.211 “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction,
and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute
itself.”212 On this analysis, a lower court could look to legislative history to
resolve an ambiguous point (for example, in this context, the meaning of
rational basis scrutiny), but could not use intent to supplant plain meaning
(for example, in this context, the functional nexus analysis). Ambiguity,
though, can arise either from specific words and phrases or from the
internal inconsistency of the statute.213
In Oklahoma, however, little record of legislative history is maintained
by the state legislature. Indeed, “[T]he Oklahoma system of recording
legislative history does not include debates, explanatory committee reports,
or other documentation which might shed light upon the reasons or
considerations motivating the action or inaction on the part of the
legislature.”214 The extent of legislative history maintained is solely the
various iterations of each bill that are presented before its codification.215
Official substantive legislative intent is not regularly kept.216
However, official bill files, maintained by the legislature, contain each
presentation of a bill from introduction to codification.217 This has been the
practice of each house of the legislature since 1989.218 Intent of the
legislature, to the extent it can be discerned, must be gleaned from the
various iterations of each bill maintained. Thus, there is scant available
legislative history through which to view vague propositions within the
statute, and certainly no such history to which a reviewing court would be
211. In re Martin’s Estate, ¶ 15, 80 P.2d at 563. The court stated, “If we are to examine
into the history of the legislation and contemporaneous circumstances, we are compelled to
admit that the act is ambiguous.” Id.
212. Id. (quoting McCain v. State Election Bd., 1930 OK 323, ¶ 0, 289 P. 759, 760)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
213. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 6, 380 P.2d 260, 263 (“Ambiguity of
statutes may arise otherwise than from fault of expression. An ambiguity justifying the
interpretation of a statute, is not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words,
but includes such as may arise in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when
all its provisions are examined. The courts regard an ambiguity to exist where the legislature
has enacted two or more provisions or statutes which appear to be inconsistent.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
214. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 1982 OK 148, ¶ 32, 663 P.2d 718, 723.
215. Resources Regarding Oklahoma’s Legislative Measures, OKLA. DEP’T OF LIBR.,
http://www.odl.state.ok.us/lawinfo/billinfo.htm (last visited July 2, 2013).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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comfortable citing. Because any interpretation of legislative intent must be
inferred from the additions to and subtractions from the iterations of the
statute, it seems a court would be more comfortable drawing its inferences
from the statute itself.
The willingness of Oklahoma courts to evaluate substantive legislative
history and the unwillingness of the state legislature to maintain such
history is a frustrating inter-branch conflict; and, none of the explanations
for this conflict amount to cogent rationale. First, perhaps contrary to
intuition, all legislative records are confidential unless specified
otherwise.219 In accordance with Oklahoma statute, “The records and files
of the Legislature, not otherwise provided by law to be open to public
inspection, shall be confidential and privileged and may be released for
public consumption only upon approval by the presiding officer of each
house respectively.”220 Second, the legislature specifically excluded itself
from inclusion in the definition of a public body in the Oklahoma Open
Records Act.221 In short, the statute provides that “[a]ll records of public
bodies and public officials shall be open to any person for inspection,
copying, or mechanical reproduction during regular business hours.”222
Public body, however, “does not mean judges, justices, the Council on
Judicial Complaints, the Legislature, or legislators.”223
The sequestration of legislative history in Oklahoma is not an accident of
omission; it is a calculated and reaffirmed aim of the legislature that is
reiterated in multiple statutes.224 For whatever reasons, the legislature has
continued its policy of confidentiality despite the aid that legislative history
would offer the judiciary and the public at large. Commentators have noted
that this confidentiality is a recurring electoral theme, but little movement
has been made beyond politicking.225 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has
219. 73 OKLA. STAT. § 73(B) (2011).
220. Id.
221. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24A.3(2) (2011).
222. Id. § 24A.5.
223. Id. § 24A.3(2) (emphasis added).
224. See id. (defining “public body” as excluding the legislature); id. § 24A.5 (allowing
inspection of “public body” records enabling additional foreclosure); 73 OKLA. STAT. §
73(B) (“The records and files of the Legislature . . . shall be confidential and privileged and
may be released for public consumption only upon approval by the presiding officer of each
house respectively.”).
225. See John Estus, Oklahoma Lawmaker Exemption Keeps Public in the Dark on
Records, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 17, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-lawmakerexemption-keeps-public-in-the-dark-on-records/article/3447088; Wayne Greene, Open
Government in Oklahoma a Work in Progress, TULSA WORLD (updated Mar. 13, 2011, 6:44
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repeated its willingness to evaluate substantive legislative history when it is
available (for example, when evaluating federal law);226 therefore, the
blame for the history of the legislature remaining sealed lies entirely with
the legislature itself.
Certainly a full body of criticism of the use of legislative history exists.
The most prominent of these refrains is the textualist view that input outside
the corners of the document is superfluous and not instructive.227 These
critics maintain that single intent is impossible to discern from the large
body of the legislature.228 Critics of legislative intent also highlight that
legislation is the product of intense debate and compromise that does not
solely seek to further the core aim of the statute; many unrelated aims are
tied into the final product.229 As well, textualists assert the danger in the
possibility of manipulation of legislative history, especially on the part of
the losing side of the vote.230 These critics also caution that legislative
history has not undergone the rigors of the legislative process and is
therefore at best unreliable and at worst an unconstitutional supplanting of
the process of law-making established by the terms of the constitution.231
Finally, many also maintain that turning to legislative intent is an
unconstitutional delegation of power to the smaller committee from which
the legislative history is derived, as the majority of instructive legislative
history is derived from smaller committees and their reports.232
Regardless of the merit of these arguments, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma has reiterated its willingness to evaluate legislative history to
interpret ambiguous statutes.233 Though some states have taken a more
AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Open_government_in_Oklahoma_a_work_in_
progress/20110313_16_a15_transp982281. But see Barbara Hoberock, Bill Would Put
Legislature Under Oklahoma Open Meeting, Records Laws, TULSA WORLD (updated Jan.
19, 2012, 4:27 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Bill_would_put_Legislature_
under_Oklahoma_open_meeting/20120119_16_a8_cutlin710342.
226. See, e.g., In re Estate of Little Bear, 1995 OK 134, 909 P.2d 42; In re Martin’s
Estate, 1938 OK 322, 80 P.2d 561.
227. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1758
(2010).
228. Id. at 1762.
229. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7
(2001).
230. Gluck, supra note 227, at 1762-63.
231. Manning, supra note 228, at 98-99.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., In re Estate of Little Bear, 1995 OK 134, 909 P.2d 42; In re Martin’s
Estate, 1938 OK 322, 80 P.2d 561.

2013]

COMMENTS

189

textualist view of legislative history, Oklahoma is not among this
company.234 It is strange that Oklahoma courts are so willing to evaluate
legislative history, despite its absence in the records of the state legislature.
Yet, this is the reality. In fact, if anything, Oklahoma courts appear to be
trending liberally in their usage of legislative history.235
For what it is worth, the phases of the bill provided by the Oklahoma
legislature can give some insight regarding the statute. Evaluation of the
various iterations of the bill shows that the “reasonably and roughly
proportional to the nature and extent of the impact of development”
provision was added after initial presentation, as was the “rational-basis
scrutiny” standard.236 The “functional nexus” standard remained constant
throughout each variation of the bill presented.237
The addition of the “reasonably and roughly proportional” standard lends
credence to the proposition that the legislature intended to adopt the “rough
proportionality” standard of Dolan, as the addition reiterates the
requirements set forth in the beginning of the subsection without the
additional modifiers. What the inclusion after the introduction of the bill
means regarding “rational basis scrutiny” is difficult to determine, but is
likely reflective of concern for the stringent nature of the statute.238
However, the provision is of little practical value. The endurance of the
“functional nexus” standard shows deliberateness by the bill’s author and a
concurrence within the committees and the legislature as a whole. These
examples illustrate the degree of inference required when evaluating the
legislative history maintained and the paucity of useful directions that may
be taken from it. The need for maintaining substantive legislative history in
the Oklahoma legislature is obvious.
VII. Examples of Other Issues
Interestingly, as a concluding example of the potential problems beyond
those discussed in this Comment, the manner in which a development fee is
defined may frustrate the purpose of the statute. Redundancy caused by the
234. Gluck, supra note 227, at 1758-59 (discussing the endurance of textualism in some
states).
235. Darla Jackson, Legislative History: A Guide for the State of Oklahoma, 30 LEGAL
REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 119, 120 (2011). See generally Sur. Bail Bondsmen of Okla., Inc. v.
Ins. Comm’r, 2010 OK 73, ¶ 26, 243 P.3d 1177, 1185.
236. History of a Bill: SB708, supra note 17.
237. Id.
238. Some state senators were concerned about the degree of control the bill removed
from municipalities. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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statutory definition and the statute itself also raises questions regarding the
scope of the statute. Both the way a development fee is defined in nature
and the way that it is defined in imposition create issues regarding the rest
of the statute.
A. Development Fee: A Strict Definition
The definition of development fees is “any payment of money imposed,
in whole or in part, as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat
approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to pay for public
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to expand
or modify existing development.”239 It is arguable that a fee assessed on
development not tied to infrastructure improvement is permissible and
outside the reach of the statute because of the portion of the definition that
clarifies a development fee exists “to the extent the fee is to pay for public
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to expand
or modify existing development.”240 This observation, however, must be
clarified by the statutory definition of “public infrastructure systems.”
The statute enumerates eight categories of improvements falling within
the definition of “public infrastructure systems.”241 However, the definition
does not limit “public infrastructure systems” to the eight categories
given.242 Under the statute, “any real property improvement, fixture, or
accession” can be included within the definition of “public infrastructure
system.”243 Thus, the seemingly limited definition of a development fee
actually applies to purpose with a physical element.
B. Internal Redundancy
Section 895 provides in subsection (B) that development fees may only
be charged for capital improvements.244 If evaluated in a vacuum, it appears
the subsection mandates that fees only be assessed for the purpose of capital
improvements. However, by statutory definition, a development fee is only
a fee imposed for that very purpose.245 Thus, this redundancy introduces
confusion and presents two alternatives: either the statute is simply
redundant, or the statute is intended to be preclusive in the purpose in which
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(1) (2011).
Id.
Id. § 895(A)(3).
See id.
Id.
Id. § 895(B).
Id. § 895(A)(1).
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any fee tied to development may be assessed. The development community
would likely argue for the latter characterization as the statute seeks to
broadly limit the scope of fees assessed on new development.
C. Permitting and Zoning: An End-around?
As well, by definition, development fees are only such fees that are
assessed “as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat approval,
or zoning change.”246 This definitional observation brings to mind an
important question. If a development fee is assessed through a method
outside of the enumerated means in the definition, can a municipality avoid
the provisions of the statute? Because the definition does not contain the
same “including but not limited to” language found in other portions of the
statute, it appears that logically the answer must be “yes.”247
An important determination is whether municipalities in Oklahoma have
such power to assess the fee through, perhaps, a “connection” or
“incorporation” fee; many municipalities assess fees in this matter already.
Though subsection (N) addresses connection fees, it does so only when
connection fees exceed the costs attributable to the new development.
Certainly, this is a quick fix by the legislature if this is the case. However,
with shifting demographics, such a change might be a political fight in the
next decade.
As well, simple timing may be enough to remove a development fee
from the ambit of the statute. That is, even the phrasing of the imposition of
a development fee would remove the development fee from the governance
of the statute. If, for example, a developer became legally responsible for
the amount of a fee at the commencement of construction, rather than
payment being a prerequisite condition, a development fee scheme might
altogether avoid the restrictions of the statute. Though a court might view
this as a bald attempt to avoid the impositions of the statute, it cannot be
disregarded that the “including but not limited to” language is noticeably
absent in this portion of the statute, where it logically would be present.
These additional concerns highlight the judicial mess this statute could
create should development fees become a contested issue in the future.
VIII. Conclusion
The codification of section 895 displayed foresight by the suburban
development community and its representatives in the Oklahoma
246. Id.
247. Compare id, with id. § 895(B)(4).

192

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:155

legislature. As Oklahoma City becomes more bipolar with the growth of the
inner-city, disagreements regarding fair distribution of infrastructure costs
are certain to arise. To use the argot of the ex-urbanites, it seems the
growing urban population in the city has been cut off at the pass. However,
through the languishing nature of the bill’s passage, the statute as codified
is both imprecise in achieving its aim and possibly vulnerable to back-door
exceptions.
Though Oklahoma courts have not had the occasion to decide whether to
extend Nollan/Dolan Takings Clause jurisprudence, it appears that section
895 answers that question in the affirmative; the language of the statute
draws parallels to the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence
involving real estate exactions. This provides both a reviewing court and a
municipality implementing a development fee scheme a degree of certainty
beyond the language of the statute itself.
Without question the most perplexing inclusion in the statute is the
mandate that a reviewing court employ rational basis review when
evaluating a challenged development fee system. As stated before, this
provision is of no substantial value. The plain and ordinary meaning of
“rational basis” must be abandoned for the sake of the statute as a whole.
Therefore rational basis must be only a baseline in judicial review,
rendering the subsection superfluous.
The unfortunate aspect of the statute, however, is not its conclusions—it
is the handwringing required to settle upon them. The legislature ignored
available, clearly defined phraseology, and this has possibly led to an
outcome outside of the legislature’s original intent. The history of judicial
grappling with development fees begs for a level of clarity absent from the
statute. A simple survey of nearby jurisdictions would have made clear the
need for clarity and exactitude in this area of the law. However, the
legislature chose both to use well-established language in a manner
antithetical to the statute, and to adopt language used typically in an entirely
separate context. Clarity, it seems, be damned.
Substantive legislative history would have also been instructive in this
matter; and, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has an unquestioned history
of utilizing substantive legislative history when it is available (for example,
in the context of federal statutory interpretation). However, as substantive
legislative intent is not documented because of a willful withholding by the
state legislature, it is impossible to affirmatively determine intent, certainly
so in a manner that would affect an interpretation by a reviewing court.
Though criticisms exist of the utilization of legislative intent, Oklahoma
courts largely have ignored them, even liberalizing their approach to its use
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in recent cases. Oddly, this is in spite of the lack of state legislative history.
Of the scant “history” that is available to the public, there is none that the
court would utilize as the basis of its decision.
Finally, the definitions create uncertainty regarding the scope of the
statute. A court would have to pit legislative intent against logical
conclusions if evaluating a development fee scheme that implicated such
definitional problems. Also possibly significant are the potential loopholes
in the manner of assessment of a development fee. The same is true
concerning the time which fees are assessed. Depending upon the need for
revenue, these scenarios may not be farfetched speculation.
At its best, section 895 serves to ensure equitable allocation of costs to
new development; however, at its worst, the statute is an attempt to
maintain unfairly low assessments on new development. Oklahoma City is
at the low end of the spectrum of imposed development fees. What is
certain, however, is that this statute is an example of the damage that can be
done to a bill if it is moved through more committees than necessary. The
statute is, in a word, clunky. It is an inartful example of impulse and
perhaps panic ignoring form and function. It may turn out that section 895
is an onerous, bureaucratic, and completely avoidable bit of legislation.
Brandon Davis Kemp

